Pesachim 62-68
From the Desk of Rabbi Yaakov Fisch
The study of Daf Yomi this week was fascinating and informative in covering a delightful smorgasbord of topics. The Seforim teach that if you randomly learn a certain area of Torah study and come across a reference related to a timely event, this is considered a good omen. This is something that I have been increasingly attentive to as we find many nuggets related to the times we are living in during our Daf Yomi learning. For example, last week, we read Parshas Bo. It just so happened that the majority of discussion from last week’s Daf learning was related to the Pesach offering, which is sourced in Parshas Bo. This week we read Parshas Besha-lach, and there is both a reference to our weekly Haftorah and our weekly Parsha in our Daf studies. The reference to the Haftorah is from Devorah in the Book of Judges. The Gemara uses Devorah as an example of someone who lost some of their knowledge and wisdom due to self-aggrandizement. The reference to the Parsha is the verse quoted that Moshe brought the bones of Yosef with him in the camp of the Leveim. The Seforim teaches us about the more profound message of Yosef’s bones in the presence of Moshe. It wasn’t just the physical bones that he carried with him. It was the spiritual ideals that Yosef embodied that Moshe emulated and internalized. It struck me that Yosef’s values are more relevant to us than ever in our daily struggles, and we should do our best to take his bones with us as well.
Have a Peaceful Shabbos,
Rabbi Yaakov Fisch
Pesachim 62
The Braisa states in the name of “others.” If one had the circumcised people initially in mind and then had the uncircumcised in mind — the Pesach would be kosher. However, if the initial intent was for the uncircumcised and only then he had the intent for the circumcised — it would be invalid. The Gemara has a few different approaches as to why this is the case. The first approach suggests that this is according to the position of אינה לשחיטה אלא בסוף which means the precise moment of shechita is the last moment when the second siman of shechita is severed (the two simanim are the trachea and the esophagus). The dissenting opinion maintains that the shechita is a process that begins when the shochet starts the incision and concludes when the second siman is severed. This approach also maintains Rabbi Meir’s position that when you have two contradictory intentions, then we determine the outcome based on the initial intent. Therefore, it is precisely at that moment (end of shechita) that is essential to determine its status. If he had in mind the circumcised, then it’s acceptable, but if he had the uncircumcised initially in mind its not acceptable. The Chelkas Yaakov says that a similar dispute would be applicable by the Bris Milah.
According to one view, the Milah begins with the mohel starts the process and only concludes at the end of the priah. According to other opinion, the precise moment of the Mitzvah is at the conclusion. A practical difference between the two approaches is if the Bris is being performed on Shabbos and the two mohelim want to participate in the Mitzvah. One would like to perform the Milah, and one would like to perform the priah. If we view the Milah as a process, then technically two people can participate in the process. However, if we consider the Milah as precisely being completed at than end, then it would not be appropriate to have two people performing the Milah. This is a dispute in the laws of Milah in the Shulchan Aruch in Ch. 266:14 of the Laws of Milah. The Shulchan Aruch rules that one should refrain from having two people participate in the Milah, and the Rema says it’s ok. These are their words from 266:14 in the laws of Milah.
יֵש לִּזָהֵר שֶּלאֹּ יָמוּלוּ שְנֵי מוֹהֲלִּים מִּילָה אַחַת בְשַבָת, שֶּזֶּה יָמוּל
וְזֶּה יִּפְרַע, אֶּלָא הַמָל הוּא עַצְמוֹ יִּפְרַע. }הַגָה: וְלא מָצָאתִּי
רְאָיָה לִּדְבָרָיו, וְאַדְרַבָה נִּרְאֶּה לִּי דְשָרֵי דְהָא מִּילָה דָחְיָא
שַבָת כְמוֹ עֲבוֹדָה בַמִּקְדָש שֶּכַמָה כֹּהֲנִּים הָיוּ עוֹבְדִּים
וּמְחַלְלִּים שַבָת, דְמֵאַחַר דְשַבָת נִּתָּן לִּדְחוֹת הֲרֵי הוּא כְחֹּל
לְכָל דָבָר
Pesachim 63
The Mishna introduces to us the prohibition of לא תשחט על חמץ . The basic understanding of this is that one cannot have chometz in his pos-session if the Pesach is being brought. That is the statement of the Tanna Kamma. R’ Yehuda adds that one violates the prohibition if he brings the Tamid and has chometz in his possession. R’ Shimon has an interesting approach to the prohibition of לא תשחט על חמץ . He says that one violates the prohibition whenever there is a valid shechita. If the Pesach was brought as Lishmah then it’s valid and one would violate the prohibition of he possesses chometz. That would not apply if the shechita was not effective i.e. it was brought on Erev Pesach that was not Lishmah. Inversely, if other sacrifices were brought during Pesach (on Chol Hamoed) with chometz in his possession, he would violate the prohibition of לא תשחט על חמץ . Rashi adds (in his commentary to R’ Shimon) that one would also violate בל
יראה ובל ימצא . The question is that in his earlier commentary (on the Tanna Kamma) he makes no mention of violating בל יראה ובל ימצא . The Tosfos Yom Tov derives from here that one does not violate the prohibition of בל יראה ובל
ימצא for having chometz in his possession on Erev Pesach. One would only violate this prohibition of בל יראה ובל ימצא for having chometz in his possession during Pesach. This seems to be
inconsistent with Rashi earlier in the tractate on 4a who states that thee would be the prohibition of בל יראה ובל ימצא after the sixth hour of the day of he had chometz in his possession. The Tzlach answers this question suggesting that of course, according to Rashi one can vio-late this prohibition of בל יראה
ובל ימצא on Erev Pesach. However, Rashi at the begin-ning of our Mishna is pointing out that one can violate לא
תשחט על חמץ without בל יראה
ובל ימצא and that would be applicable in a case where the shochet did not possess the chometz, but one of the people in the chabura had the chometz in his possession. However, Rashi in the latter part of the Mishah refers to Rabbi Shimon’s position and is commenting on the case during Pesach, in which there is no chabura. The person is bringing the sacrifice himself had chometz in his possession, and that is why there also the prohi-bition of בל יראה ובל ימצא . In terms of halacha, the Mishna Berura comments in Ch 443: 1 of the Laws of Pesach that there are many poskim that state there is no prohibition of בל יראה ובל
ימצא on Erev Pesach and this only starts on Pesach itself. These are his words:
וכן לענין בל
יראה ובל ימצא הסכימו כמה פוסקים דאין עובר במה
שמשהה החמץ משש שעות ומעלה כ”ז שלא הגיע ימי
הפסח גופא מדכתיב שבעת ימים שאור לא ימצא בבתיכם
וגו’ ולא יראה לך שאור בכל גבולך שבעת ימים
Pesachim 64
לאהבתי כי ישמע ה' מפני שעמה מועט
The Mishna states that the recitation of Hallel was part of the process as the Pesach was brought. The Mishna elaborates as to how the service handled the mass offerings and stipulates that the recitation of Hallel accompanied the proceedings. Tosfos quotes the Braisa, which states it was the Levites that sang the Hallel. He then questions how the Levites were able to sing the Hillel as there is a rule that Shirah can only be said/sung in the place of wine or libations? Tosfos responds by saying that rule is only applicable during the הקרבה . However, our Mishna is referring to the time of the Shechita, and there is no stipulation that it must be with wine. Rashi has a different approach, and he interprets the Mishna as everyone reciting the Hallel and not just the Levites reciting it. According to Rashi, there would not be a question from Tosfos, as the rule of only reciting Shirah in the presence of wine is only applicable to Levites and not the general population. The Brisker Rav explains the dispute between Rashi and Tosfos with the following analysis. Rashis position is that the Hallel was not a שיר של קרבן and the Levites did not have to sing that. Whereas according to Tosfos, the recitation of the Hallel was a שיר של קרבן , and the Levites were required to sing it. He questions ac-cording to Rashi, how is it possible to suggest that the recitation of the Hallel was not a שיר של
קרבן ? The Mishna states in Erchin that this one of the days that the musical instrument of the Chalil was played in the Beis Hamikdash!! This was a
שיר של קרבן if it was listed there! I heard a fascinating insight from R’ Avraham Schorr to explain Rashi’s position on this issue. He suggests that even according to Rashi, the Levites were reciting the Hallel as the Braisa relates. The difference between the recitation of Hallel during the other sacrifices and for Pesach is that in those cases the Levites playing a prominent role in leading the Shirah or even singing it by them-selves. This is reflected with the words אומרים . On the other hand, during Pesach, the Levites did sing the Hallel but just as everyone else sang it, and that is why it doesn’t say אומרים in the context of Hallel on Pesach but rather קוראים . That is why the question of Tosfos does not apply to Rashi as the issue of the Levites singing the Hallel on Pesach is in a much more limited role. We see from here that the role of Hallel during Pesach has an outsized role in comparison to other days. That is why perhaps many have the practice of reciting the Hallel after Maariv on Pesach eve. The Shulchan Aruch says that one should recite the Hallel on Pesach during Maariv and the Rema disagrees. Everyone agrees that Hallel has incorporated into the Seder and that perhaps reflects the message our Daf today about the role of Hallel on Pesach. These are the words of the Shulchan Aruch and the Rema in Ch. 487:4 of the Laws of Pesach
בְלֵיל רִּאשוֹן שֶּל פֶּסַח גוֹמְרִּין הַהַלֵל
בְצִּבוּר בִּנְעִּימָה בִּבְרָכָה תְּחִּלָה וְסוֹף, וְכֵן בְלֵיל שֵנִּי שֶּל שְנֵי
יָמִּים טוֹבִּים שֶּל גָלֻיוֹת. }הַגָה: וְכָל זֶּה אֵין אָנוּ נוֹהֲגִּים כֵן, כִּי
אֵין אָנוּ אוֹמְרִּים בַלַיְלָה בְבֵית הַכְנֶּסֶּת הַהַלֵל כְלָל .
Pesachim 65
The Braisa states that there was such an abun-dance of blood on Erev Pesach as the Korban Pesach was brought en masse. They were literally walking in the blood, which was up to their knees. The Gemara questions how this was allowed as the blood should have been a chatzitza!! A chatzitza is a foreign object that separates the person’s body and the entity it is supposed to contact. In this case, the Kohein is supposed to be standing on the Beis Hamikdash floor (Temple), and if there is a pool of blood, then clearly it is a chatzitza! The Gemara responds and clarifies that blood in its liquid form is not a chatzitza. The Beis Yosef in Ch 198:16 in the laws of Chatzitzah says that blood that is be-ginning to congeal is considered a chatzita de-spite it being in its liquid form. (The context is about a woman going to the mikva for purification from her niddah status.) This law’s source is the Rambam and the
Smag questions that this seems to be inconsistent with our Gemara, which states that blood in its liquid form is not a chatzitza!! The Acharonim make the following distinction between the two cases. In the case of our Gemara it is not required for the skin of his feet to be on the floor but rather it is important for the Kohein to be standing in the Beis Hamikdash. It teaches us that he is standing on top of blood does not make it as if he’s not standing in the sanctuary. However, in the laws of chatzitzah about a woman going to the mikva, it is necessary for the water to immerse every part of her body. If the blood is even beginning to congeal, that would render it a chatzitzah as there is a foreign object on the part of her body that the water cannot immerse. That is the justification of the Rambam that the Shulchan Aruch quotes in the laws of Chatzitzah.
Pesachim 66
The Gemara describes an innovative way to get the knife to the Beis Hamikdash to bring the Pesach on Shabbos. The Gemara suggests that one place in the horns or its wool (depending on the type of animal). The Gemara explains that it is not an issue of Meilah or violating the animal’s consecrated status as it only becomes consecrated once it arrives in the Beis Hamikdash. The Gemara asks how one can consecrate this on Shabbos. The response that since this is a korban that must be brought that day, it would be ok to declare it consecrated. Why didn’t the Gemara say the person declared it to be consecrated on Friday but only wanted it to take effect on Shabbos. The Sefas Emes points out from here that it appears that this proposal would not be acceptable since the consecrated status takes effect on Shabbos. (Rabbi Akiva Eiger has a question in general if this is appropriate in commerce for someone to initiate a business transaction on Friday that would culminate on Shabbos.) There is a well-known question from the Nemukei Yosef on Bava Kamma according to the opinion of אשו
משום חציו which means that the liability that one has for his fire damaging the property of others is equivalent to shooting an arrow and that arrow
damaging the property. Although a person initiates a process, he is responsible for everything from the subsequent action as an active result from the initial action. Based on this theory, he questions how someone can light Shabbos candles before Shabbos, the fire that continues to burn on Shabbos will be the “arrow” that was shot before Shabbos. He responded by saying that the premise of אשו
משום חציו is that we view the entire action being concluded immediately after the fire was started just as we view the action being concluded the moment the arrow was shot. Therefore, he argues that the Shabbos candles lit prior to Shabbos are considered fully executed already since they were lit before Shabbos. This is exactly the opposite of the proposal in our Ge-mara as the initial declaration was made on Friday but stipulated that the declaration should culminate on Shabbos. Since it was stipulated that the consecration should be concluded on Shabbos, it would not be an acceptable solution in our sugya.
Pesachim 67
A metzora is required to live in solitude (in quarantine!!) This means he was prohibited from entering all three camps. The three camps were the camps of Shechina (for kohanim), Leveim, and the third was known as Camp of Israel (for the general population). Rav Chisda teaches us that even if the Metzora violated this prohibition and entered the camps — he would not be subject to the punishment of lashes. The reason for this is that this is prohibition that is connected to the positive Mitzvah of בדד
ישב . Rashi interprets this as a standard לאו
הניתק לעשה . This means that although the Torah communicated the Mitzvah as a negative prohibition, one would not get lashes as he has the opportunity to correct this with a positive Mitzvah. In this case, there is a prohibition to the Metzora from entering the camps. However, if the Metzora enters the camps, there is recourse and he doesn’t get the lashes. This is because the verse בדד ישב is coming to correct the prohibition of entering the camps. Tosfos disagrees with this approach and holds this is not a classic example of לאו הניתק לעשה . In other instances of לאו הניתק לעשה , the Torah states the prohibition and then says the re-course as to how to correct it with the positive Mitzvah. In this case, of Metzora, the point of the Gemara is that it was
downgraded from a negative prohibition to a positive mitzvah of בדד ישב . Tosfos qualifies his statement by saying that this only applies if the Metzora enters the Machane Yisroel. If he entered the Machane of the Leveim, he would violate a negative prohibition as this is not different than a Zav entering this area. The Sefas Emes points out that this is only according to the opinion of Tosfos, that the prohibition was downgraded to a positive Mitzvah and qualifies this by saying that it wasn’t downgraded if the Metzora entered the area of the Leveim. However, according to Rashi, the point of Rav Chisda is that there is a way to correct the prohibition with a positive mitzvah. This correction can be applied if the Metzora entered the area of the Leveim.
Pesachim 68
The Gemara presents a dispute between Rabbi Eliezer and Rabbi Yehoshua about how one should spend their time on Yom Tov. The dilemma is that one verse suggests that the Yom Tov’s purpose is to spend time with G-d and the other verse indicates that one should indulge in eating and drinking on Yom Tov. According to Rabbi Eliezer, one can choose if he will pursue spirituality or eating and drinking on Yom Tov. However, according to Rabbi Yehoshua, one should incor-porate both the spiritual and materialistic aspects into Yom Tov. He refers to this as חציו לה’ וחציו לכם. Rabbi Elazar states that on Shavuos, everyone would admit that one must pursue לכם as it’s the day the Torah was given. This seems quite counterintuitive!! If Shavuos is the day, the Torah is given, then one should be pursuing לה’ and engaging in spirituality and not in לכםor materialistic pursuits? I want to suggest an ap-proach based on a very bizarre-sounding verse in the Torah. Immediately after the giving of the To-rah at Mt. Sinai, the Torah in Parshas Mishpatim says the following word: חֱ זוּ אֶּ ת־הָ אֱלֹקים וַיֹּאכְ לוּ ֶּיַו תּוְּשִּיַו. The translation is that the Jewish people gazed at G-d and then went on to eat and drink. It
משום חציו which means that the liability that one has for his fire damaging the property of others is equivalent to shooting an arrow and that arrow
seems shocking that in the immediate aftermath of the most extraordinary spiritual experience in history, our ancestors would immediately start eating and drinking!! Rashi actually points out that this behavior was inappropriate, and they were punished for this later. I want to suggest an ap-proach based on the Mesilas Yesharim explana-tion of Kedusha/holiness. He argues that Kedusha does not mean to abstain from earthly or worldly pleasures. Quite the opposite. G-d created us and put us in this world to enjoy this material world. He wants us to elevate and infuse the material world with spirituality and goodness. That is the defini-tion of Kedusha. Perhaps that is why immediately after the giving of the Torah, the Jews were on such a high spiritual level that they wanted to channel all that spiritual energy into their material world of eating and drinking. I would like to apply that concept to our Gemara and why everyone agrees that on Shavuos, everyone agrees that we need the לכם aspect. Precisely because the Shavuos is the celebration of the giving of the Torah, we must engage the materialistic world with Kedusha/holiness and elevate the לכם in our lives.